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Introduction

Critics of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)' prevail on
the internet, the forum the Act intended to serve. 2 Common sentiment
bemoans the law as pushed by deep pockets to hold down the public
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2008. Written
under the supervision of Adjunct Professor Cecily Mak, instructor of the Digital Media Law
Seminar at U.C. Hastings College of the Law. Infinite thanks to her for her suggestions and
support.
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
2.

See, e.g., The Issue: U.S. Constitution, Unintended Consequences, http://www.anti-

dmca.org/whats-wrong.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2008); Jonathan Bailey, Punditry Saturday:
Why

I

Hate

the

DMCA,

Plagiarism

Today,

Oct

8th,

http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2005/10/08/punditry-saturday-why-i-hate-the-dmca/.
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through strong-arm content protection, often with the implicit suggestion
that the DMCA is on shaky legal ground.3 Critics point to a multitude of
unintended side-effects, further implying that the DMCA is the leader in a
parade of horribles.
What lies beneath critics' DMCA loathing is a
sweeping anxiety over the privatization of copyright.
Although highly criticized, the DMCA earned a unanimous Senate
vote along with President Bill Clinton's signature in 1998.6 Its goal was to
bring U.S. copyright law "squarely into the digital age" by making "digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials."7
The DMCA purported to create the "legal platform for launching the global
digital online marketplace ....
Because deep pockets influence most modem legislation, scrutinizing
the DMCA's lobbyist roots does little to distinguish it from other
commercial laws. The vast majority of emotionally charged criticism fails
to note that, despite its flaws, the DMCA may be a completely legitimate
and valuable piece of legislation. Indeed, while consumer rights arguments
flooded internet blogs, litigants and legal commentators made additional
challenges to the Act on constitutional grounds. 9
With the support of recent case law, statistics, and legal analysis, this
note defends the DMCA and its copyright protection mechanisms. The
DMCA should be readily acknowledged as a push toward the privatization
of copyright. Furthermore, the vast amount of criticism surrounding the
DMCA wrongly shifts the focus away from what its provisions have
accomplished.
This note addresses three main challenges to the DMCA's
constitutionality: (1) that it exceeds the scope of Congressional authority as
restrained by the Intellectual Property Clause, (2) that it oversteps the
boundaries of First Amendment protection, and (3) that the doctrine of fair
use is unconstitutionally intruded. This note concludes that privatization of
copyright under the DMCA is a constitutionally sound response to
technology's outpacing of the law. Additionally, society should encourage
3. Unintended Consequences, supra note 2. See also John Dvorak, Free Speech at Risk, PC
Magazine Online, Oct. 13, 2003, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,1335801,00.asp ("Mind you, this
Lsm violation of an illegal law that Congress seems content to enforce.").
4. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA,
April 2006, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended-consequences.php#Section7.
5. See, e.g., Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law, The DMCA 's Push to
Privatize Copyright, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 607, 609 (2001).
6 Wildpedia, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMCA (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007).
7. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002).
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the privatization of copyright to allow for optimal progress of the digital
media industry.
II. Background
A. Napster
In 1999, Shawn Fanning released the original Napster peer-to-peer file
sharing system.10 Just as Johann Sebastian Bach's death marked the end of
Baroque music, June 1, 1999 sufficiently marked the crest and beginning of
the fall of music's physical distribution." Through the 1990s, the total
physical distribution of CDs rose steadily. 12 The peak technically came in
2000, although it was a mere 0.4% increase from 1999.13 In 2005, total
album sales were 30% below their 1999 levels, 14 which have fallen steadily
each year since 2000.15
These statistics show that a sweeping change in the music business
occurred at around 2000. In under a year, Napster went from having zero
to 60 million users per month! 16 The original Napster was the most
conspicuous manifestation of a changing technological landscape. First
17
and foremost, these 60 million users came because the music was free.
Consumers no longer had to go to a physical music store, or deal with
creating cumbersome or poor quality copies dubbed from CDs to tapes, and
the selection of music was at least good enough to keep them coming back
for more. 18
From a legal standpoint, the original Napster's fatal flaw was its
central database for song titles. 19 This theoretically gave Napster
supervision over what people were doing on the network.20 When coupled

10.

Wikipedia, Napster, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).

11.
12.

Id.
The Recording Industry Association of America's 2000 Year-end Statistics (on file with

author).
13.
14.

Id.
Saul Hansell, Putting the Napster Genie Back in the Bottle, Nov. 20, 2005, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov.
20,
2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/20/business/yourmoney/
htmlex = 1290142800&en=847e39c379d344d5&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
15.

20fanning.

The Recording Industry Association of America's 2005 Year-end Statistics (on file with

author).
16. Marshall Brain, How Gnutella Works, http://www.howstuffworks.com/file-sharing.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Katie

Dean,

Videos

Quick, Easy

and Automatic, WIRED,

http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,66231,00.html.

Jan.

11,

2005,
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with a clear, centralized target, the Ninth Circuit had all it needed to shut
Napster down. 21 All of Napster's attempted fair use defenses failed, and
the court found it contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright
infringement. 22 The court's conclusion
rested heavily on "Napster's failure
' 23
to police the system's 'premises.'
Statistics show that consumer demand for peer-to-peer file sharing
was far too high to be wiped out by a Napster shut down. Soon a vast array
of options developed to feed consumers' free music cravings. The Gnutella
network is one of the most popular today, and has yet to be shut down
despite a hostile legal climate.24 Gnutella's survival is primarily due to two
departures from the original Napster set-up: Gnutella does not have a
centralized database, and it permits many different client applications to
connect to the network.2 5
Decentralized file sharing systems are a major force in the music
industry. In 2003, an average of 5.6 million people were logged onto the
peer-to-peer networks at any given time.26 By 2005 that figure had grown
to 9.6 million people.27 Thus, it should come as no surprise that concurrent
to this growth record labels saw physical distribution sales crumble.
B.

Legal Digital Distribution

MP3 technology forced the major record labels (Universal Music
Group, Sony BMG, Warner, and EMI) to completely rethink their business
models.2 8 Emergence of the MP3 file format allowed consumers to easily
compress and share digital music files, and common computer equipment
29
permitted consumers to decode their CDs and turn them into MP3s.
Consumers could then "share[], cop[y], store[] on computers or even
3°
broadcast" music at sound quality levels nearly as high as that of CDs.
The original Napster facilitated swapping MP3 files between computers.
With 57 million downloads of the Napster software between 1999 and

21. See A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. Id. at 1022-1024.
23. Id. at 1024.
24. Brain, supra note 16.
25. Id.
26. P2P
File
Sharing,
P2P Use
Continues
to
Grow,
http://www.p2pweblog.com/5022671 l/p2p..use-continuesjto-grow.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Kostas Kasaras, Music in the Age of Free Distribution, FIRST MONDAY, Jan.
2002, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7 l/kasaras/index.html.
29. Michael Slinger & Amy Hillman, Napster: Catalystfor a New Industry or Just Another
Dot Corn? The Ivey Case Study, Ivey Bus. J., Vol. 66 No. 3, 45, Jan. 1, 2002.
30. Id.
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2001, the prevalence of unlawful MP3 distribution gravely threatened the
major labels' ability to enforce their copyrights. 3'
The potent combination of compression and file-sharing technology
compelled major labels to find new sources of revenue without further
threatening their copyrights. Their response-widely considered long
overdue-was to make content available via legal digital distribution
channels.32 Because so many people were using cyberspace to steal
copyrighted content as MP3s, major label executives refused to sell
unprotected MP3s. 33 The labels were concerned that such a move would
merely fan the piracy fire.34
The major labels ultimately agreed to make their content available
online with copy protection in place. 35 In 2002, Universal made 43,000
music tracks available for sale via digital download, but decided against
offering unprotected MP3s. 36 Apple CEO Steve Jobs affirmed the labels'
concern; when he approached the major labels for licenses to digitally
distribute their content, they were "extremely cautious. 37
At the time, the solution seemed to be Digital Rights Management,
commonly known as DRM.3 8 DRM technology "focused on security and
encryption [of digital files] as a means of solving the issue of unauthorized
copying., 39 The idea was to remove control over digital content from the
hands of its possessor and put a computer program in charge.40 DRM
allowed Apple "to negotiate landmark usage rights at the time, which
include[d] allowing users to play their DRM protected music on up to 5
computers and on an unlimited number of iPods.",4 1 Universal, Sony,
Warner and EMI control over 70% of the world's music, making the labels

31. Id.
32. See Amy Harmon, Grudgingly, Labels Sell Songs Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/01/technology/01 TUNE.html?ex=I 194062400&en=
8d170664 IbcO 1e58&ei=5070.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.;
Steve
Jobs,
Thoughts
on
Music,
Feb.
6,
2007,
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/.
36. DRM Watch, Vivendi Universal Announces Music Trachs [sic] for Paid Download,
Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.drmwatch.com/ocr/article.php/3106941.
37. Jobs, supra note 35.
38. Heather
McDonald,
Digital
Rights
Management
Controversy,
http://musicians.about.com/od/resources/a/drmcontroversy-2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
39. Renato lannella, Digital Rights Management (DRM) Architectures, D-LIB MAGAZINE,
June 2001, http://www.dlib.org/dlib/june01/iannella/06iannella.html.
40. Julia
Layton,
How
Digital
Rights
Management
Works,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/drm.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
41. Jobs, supra note 35.
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42

a critical gatekeeper for the proliferation of legal digital distribution. For
example, this level of clout helped the labels to insert a key provision in
their agreements with Apple: reserving the right to withdraw their entire
system fail and allow content to be
music catalogue should the DRM
43
available in unauthorized places.

C. DRM and the DMCA
The most significant aspect of the DMCA, with respect to DRM, is the
addition of Chapter 12 to the U.S. Copyright Act. 4 The opening sentence
distills the chapter's essence: "No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title."' 4 5

Commonly known as the 'anti-circumvention provision,' 46 this

clause brought the U.S. code in line with the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) treaties by making it illegal to evade DRM
protection.47 This statutorily legitimizes the practice of swathing music
with digital chains, and prevents anyone from tampering with those chains.
DMCA critics overwhelmingly argue that the DMCA gives media
executives too much private control, rather than saving entertainment
companies from the evils of Napster and the like.48 Critics believe that the
DMCA condones content-owning companies' use of self-help. 49 In
particular, they are concerned that the DMCA gives licensors a far greater
ability to regulate their content than that allowed by previous federal
copyright law. 50 This is the privatization of copyright. 5' By allowing the
industry to build digital fences around content using DRM, the DMCA
reduces the communication utility of the internet and eliminates judicial
oversight.52 The privatization trend "is transforming the internet from a

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §1201-05 (2006).
45. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(A).
46 See, e.g., Bentley J. Olive, Anti-Circumvention and Copyright Management
Information:Analysis of New Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act, 1 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 2 (2000).
47. Id., World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Art. 18 & 19, 36 I.L.M.
76, 86-87; World Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art.
18 & 19, 36 I.L.M. 76, 86-87.
48. See Jackson, supra note 5 at 610.
49. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1089, 1091 (1998).
50. Id.
5 1. Jackson sometimes refers to this as "reprivatization" of copyright. Jackson, supra note
5. However, since copyright in its pre-DMCA form has been federal law since 1790, the term
"privatization" seems more appropriate.
52. Id. at 608.
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into a onetwo-way medium of active cultural participation among citizens
53
consumers.,
passive
to
distribution
content
for
medium
way
Yet someone in the business of selling music at the end of 2005 could
not ignore the fact that, as compared to sales in 1999, the industry lost over
$2.3 billion of business.5 4 The rise of P2P networks coupled with the sharp
decline in physical CD sales completely jarred the industry. 55 Executives
were willing to do anything to cut their losses, and DRM facilitated what
seemed to be the online solution. 56 In support, digital album sales between
2004 and 2005 increased by 198%. 7 The DMCA has roots in the recent
past, but current legal interpretations significantly affect how the industry
will move forward. 58 The present state of affairs raises questions about the
perceived privatization of copyright under the DMCA.
III. The DMCA Prevails Under Constitutional Challenges
Bona fide legal challenges to the DMCA focus on three issues
stemming from the U.S. Constitution. The first argument challenges the
DMCA's extension (or privatization) of copyright protection by invoking
the limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause.59 Second, critics
challenge the DMCA on the grounds that it violates the free speech
protections of the First Amendment. 60 Finally, opponents argue that the
DMCA unconstitutionally impinges upon copyright's fair use doctrine.61
A.

Intellectual Property Clause Restraints

1.

Boundaries

Before considering free speech and fair use, it is important to examine
whether Congress even had power under the Constitutional to enact the
DMCA. The Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the power "to

53.

Id.

54. The Recording Industry Association of America, 2005 Consumer Profile,
http://76.74.24.142/8230EBOF-3012-63C0-CCA5-AD966FAAF739.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2008).
55. Harmon, supranote 32.
56. McDonald, supra note 38.
57. The Recording Industry Association of America, supra note 15.
58. See generally United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002); Universal City
Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d
1085 (2004).
59. See Jason Hoppin, DMCA Still Faces Its First Criminal Test, THE RECORDER, March

27, 2002, availableat http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/stories/edt0327b.shtml.
60. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 610.
61.

See Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Battle for Your Digital Media Devices,

http://www.eff.org/IP/fairuse/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
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promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 62 This clause places some limits on
the extent to which copyright protection may be granted. For example, the
Supreme Court requires that protected works exhibit a "minimal level of
creativity,, 63 and the clause itself states that works can only be protected
for "limited Times," which means that protection cannot be granted for an
eternal period. 64 Opponents of the DMCA contend that because Congress
wrote the law to amend Title 17, the federal copyright statute,6 5 Congress
must have based its authority on the Intellectual Property Clause.6 6 Thus,
in addition to fair use and First Amendment arguments, the broader
argument is that67 "Congress overstepped its bounds" of the Intellectual
Property Clause.
2.

The Commerce Clause and Elcom

The Supreme Court's interpretation the Intellectual Property Clause
centers on the idea of balance.6 8 The Court is reluctant to expand the scope
of intellectual property protection on its own. 6 9 When the market is altered
by technological innovation, the Court consistently defers to the judgment
of Congress.7 ° Congress, not the Court, should handle the difficult balance
of control between the interests of copyright owners and the public with
regard to creative works.7 '
In United States v. Elcom Ltd., the defendant software company
argued that the enactment of the DMCA exceeded Congressional authority
with respect to limitations contained in the Intellectual Property Clause.7 2
The court began by reiterating Congress' broad power under the Commerce
Clause.73 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "prescribe
the rule by which commerce is governed," a power that "may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are

62. U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 8.
63. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991).
64. Congress, however, does have the power to extend the copyright term. See Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105-298, §102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (amending
17 U. S. C. §§302, 304). Affirmed in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
65.
17 U.S.C., titled "Copyrights."
66. Hoppin, supra note 59.
67. Id.
68. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1137 (2002).
73. Id. at 1138.
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prescribed by the Constitution., 74 The court held that "Congress plainly
has the power to enact the DMCA under the Commerce Clause" because
the DMCA regulates activity that has a substantial effect on interstate and
foreign commerce.75
The Elcom court next considered whether, despite sweeping
Commerce Clause power, the DMCA oversteps limitations reserved by the
Intellectual Property Clause.76 To evaluate this interaction, the court
employed the framework created in United States v. Moghadam,77 which
upheld an anti-bootlegging statute to protect live musical performances.78
In Moghadam, the court validated the statute's Commerce Clause extension
to prevent unauthorized recordings of live music, even though it remained
uncertain whether a live musical performance is a "writing" within the
meaning of the Intellectual Property Clause. 79 From Moghadam, the Elcom
court extracted a rule whereby a statute is valid if it "'is not fundamentally
inconsistent with' the Intellectual Property Clause," and is invalid if
"irreconcilably inconsistent" with the Intellectual Property Clause. °
The Elcom opinion relies heavily on legislative history to hold that the
DMCA is not fundamentally inconsistent with the Intellectual Property
Clause.81 Congress' impetus was precisely to protect the rights endowed
by the Intellectual Property Clause for a new digital landscape.82 Without
DMCA protection "copyright owners will hesitate to make their works
readily available on the internet ... ,83 Additionally, the court held that
the DMCA is not irreconcilably inconsistent with the Intellectual Property
Clause and buttressed its argument with an understated but important point:
upon the expiration of copyright, technological protection (DRM) may in
fact prevent an owner of a particular copy of the work from using it every
way he prefers.84 Nevertheless, this would still be in harmony with the
Intellectual Property Clause because it is likely that the user contractually

74. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995)).
75. Id. Congress stated expressly: "Constitutional authority for this legislation [the DMCA]
is provided in Article I, section 8, clause 3, which grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." H. Rep.
No. 105-551(11), at 35.
76. Id. at 1138-42.
77. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 1999).
78. Elcom,203 F.Supp.2d at 1138-40.
79. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
80. Elcom,203 F.Supp.2d at 1139.
81. Id.at 1140.
82. Id.
83. Id. (internal citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1141.
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acquiesced to the technological limitation. 85 Thus, Elcom upheld the
constitutionality of the DMCA by finding that Congress has power under
the Commerce Clause to enact such a statute, and that the DMCA is
sufficiently
within restraints compelled by the Intellectual Property
86
Clause.
Elcom laid a foundation for the relationship between the DMCA and
the Intellectual Property Clause, as evidenced by its extensive quotation in
a subsequent case, 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc.87 By reasserting
Elcom's opinion on the issue nearly verbatim, the cases make clear that the
constraints imposed by the Intellectual Property Clause
do not invalidate
88
Clause.
Commerce
the
under
authority
the DMCA's
The way the opinions reconcile tension between the protection of
digital commerce and constitutional restraints on that protection is the crux
of judicial blessing for the privatization of copyright. They establish new
protections from the DMCA as wholly necessary to implement the
Intellectual Property Clause in the age of widespread digital piracy. These
cases acknowledge that previous federal copyright protections were
insufficient. Moreover, condoning the use of a contract with a user to
implement a company's technological protection further pushes
jurisprudence towards validating the privatization of copyright.
B.

First Amendment Restraints

1.

A Threat to CulturalAutonomy?

In addition to challenges under the Intellectual Property Clause,
DMCA opponents have made a constitutional argument founded on
freedom of speech. 89 DRM is like a security device or safe used to protect
an owner's property, so, ostensibly, Congress may have the vast regulatory
authority it would in the distribution of skeleton keys or combinations to
safes. 90 The arguable difference however, is that people also view DRM
(and the 'keys' that unlock it) as a form of communication through
computer code, triggering certain free speech protection despite the

85. Id. The contract typically employed is a software license agreement known as an "End
User License Agreement," or EULA. See Wikipedia, EULA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eula.
86. Id. at 1141-42.
87. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
88. Diane Barker, Notes: Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 47, 56-57
(2005).
89. Dvorak, supra note 3.
90. Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453 (2d Cir. 2001).
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DMCA. 9 1 Critics, however, fear that the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions allow a copyright owner so much technological protection that it
results in a privatized shelter where free speech is unconstitutionally
encroached.
The primary flaw in such a complaint is that it relies on the
presumption that pre-intemet rights apply to the current models.9 2 Instead,
"[d]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them." 93 Mild examples of chilling
effects, which gain enormous attention, where the DMCA appears to
encroach speech in ways that seem imprudent, may exist. 94 Most
arguments, however, carry their implications too far. One commentator
believes that the DMCA threatens "cultural autonomy" and says it "limits
the ability of individuals to articulate their own meanings and thus to define
their own culture. 9 5 Flowery declamations like this unfairly shift the focus
away from the DMCA's raison d'etre and again make it the rogue of a
seemingly ill-fated privatization.9 6
2.

The Corley Decision
Universal City Studios v. Corley scrutinized the DMCA in connection

with the First Amendment. 97 The case involved an intemet website posting
decryption computer code that allowed the circumvention of DRM on
protected DVDs.9 8

The issue was whether the First Amendment could

exonerate the decryption program despite the program's patent violation of
the DMCA. 99 The court first established the First Amendment's scope as
applied to computer code.100 The First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech. . . ."'0' The court

posited that human beings often recognize computer code, and computer
experts use computer code to communicate. 10 2 Therefore, even though
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Rick Boucher, Perspective: Time to Rewrite the DMCA, Cnet News.com, Jan.
29, 2002, http://news.com.com/2010-1071 -825335.html (discussing free speech threats involving
web links). See also Dvorak, supra note 3.
93. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
94. See David Touretzky, Free Speech Rights for Programmers,COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM, vol. 4 no. 8, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery/cacm-viewpoint.html.
95. Jackson, supra note 5, at 610.
is a dramatic
96. Id. ("The ultimate outcome of... attempts to reprivatize copyright .
reduction in the utility of communication networks like the internet.").
97. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
98. Id. at 438-39.
99. Id. at 452.
100.

Id. at 445.

101. U.S. Const. amend. I.
102. Corley, 273 F.3d at 449.
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it also qualifies as speech for purposes
computer code instructs computers,
10 3
of First Amendment protection.
The case turned first on whether the DMCA was 'content neutral' with
respect to its restriction on speech. 10 4 In concluding the restriction was
indeed content neutral, the court stated the regulation is "justified without
reference to the content of regulated speech."10' 5 The court further
supported using a content-neutral standard on the conclusion that computer
code contains both speech and nonspeech elements. 10 6 In shaping its
analysis of computer code this way, the court deliberately adapted its
traditional First 107Amendment analytical framework to fit the DMCA's
modem context.
The court described the regulation as content-neutral "with an
incidental effect on a speech component."1' 0 8 This is critical to standardsetting under the DMCA because the regulation need only "serve a
substantial governmental interest" without burdening "substantially more
speech than is necessary," as long as it remains unrelated to the suppression
of free expression.109 This standard gave the DMCA great deference in
light of the realities of the Internet world, for posting the decryption
program "makes it instantly available at the click of a mouse to any person
in the world with access to the Intemet." 110 To prevent access to the
decryption program, the court expressly endorsed the level of protection
Congress granted in the DMCA, even though it is accompanied by some
communication impairment."' Therefore, the DMCA's prohibition on
because the regulation need not be
posting the program was constitutional
12
possible.'
means
restrictive
the least
Like Elcom, the Second Circuit's decision in Corley takes a
deferential stance with respect to the DMCA. Corley acknowledges the
difficult choices the government must make to protect digital media. Elcom
demonstrated Congress' initial ability to regulate digital media, and Corley
extended that ability to the point of allowing a constriction on speech in the

103. Id. at n. 23.
104. Id. at 451.
105. Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)).
106. Id. at451.
107. Id. ("Differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them" (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969))).
108. Id. at 454.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 457-58.
112.

Id. at 455.
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interest of digital protection." l3 Although the government set the rule,
protective constriction is ultimately done not by the government, but by
private parties through security technologies like DRM. Thus, courts are
setting the stage for a constitutionally sound shift toward the privatization
of copyright under the DMCA.
C. Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use seeks to balance the protection of copyright
with the desire to preserve public access to works under limited
circumstances. 14 While an exhaustive discussion of fair use is beyond the
scope of this note, courts' interpretation of fair use as it relates to the
DMCA are relevant.
Anti-DMCA extremists believe that content
companies are "hoping to take away your fair use rights and sell them back
to you.' ' 115 This economic argument goes to the heart of privatization.
Companies "aim to veto exciting new uses that may upset their existing
business models." ' 1 6 By wrapping DRM around content, companies gain
an unfair economic advantage and make consumers pay more to access
more use-limited copyrighted works. 1 7 Furthermore, DMCA opponents
invoke fair use to fulfill the Constitution's purpose behind the Intellectual
Property Clause, which is "to promote the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts." ' 1 8 Progress comes about by social dialogue, resistance to the
messages of traditional media systems, and transformation of copyrighted
works into new expressions." 9 Fair use, the argument goes, is a necessary
means to preserve progress under the 0Constitution, and is diminished by the
DMCA's privatization of copyright.12
These concerns are legitimate, but like those regarding the First
1 21
Amendment, they are not the primary concern of Congress or the courts.
Although legal arguments can easily intertwine fair use and First

113. See generally United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002); Corley, 273
F.3d 429.
114. See 17 U.S.C. 107. Examples of fair use include "criticism, comment, news reporting,
[and] teaching." Id.
115. The Battlefor Your DigitalMedia Devices, supra note 61.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl.8. n5.
119. Jackson, supra note 5, at 617.
120. Id. at 609-19.
121. See generally 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (2004); United States
v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001).
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Amendment issues, 122 the court in 321 Studios v. MGM Studios held that
the First Amendment does not provide a right to make fair use of
copyrighted works. 123 The fair use doctrine is understood by courts to be
an "equitable rule of reason."'' 24 Elcom states, "there is no direct authority
for the proposition that the doctrine of fair use is coextensive with the First
Court has never held that fair use is
Amendment."' 125 In fact, "the Supreme
126
all.
at
required"
constitutionally
321 Studios, Elcom, and Corley are consistent in their affirmation of
the DMCA in light of the fair use doctrine. 127 "We know of no authority
for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much
less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the
identical format of the original."' 128 Many traditional fair uses of DVDs are
not limited by the DMCA, including quoting a screenplay or commenting
on it. 129 The courts are not sympathetic to the fact that a fair user might
need to do so "the old fashioned way," which could mean hand-typing a
piece of digital text.' 30 The old fashioned way might even mean "recording
portions of the video images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a
camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it displays the DVD
movie." '31 The court expressly rejected the proposition that fair use
guarantees access to a work by the user's "preferred technique or in the
format of the original." 3 2
These holdings give enormous deference to the DMCA. 133 By
invoking the 'old fashioned way' to make a fair use, 134 they are direct in
their sanction of a law which allows copyright owners to privately limit
access in unprecedented ways. The Elcom court believes "piracy of

122. See, e.g., TyAnna Herrington, The Interdependency of Fair Use and the First
Amendment, available at http://kairos.technorhetoric.net/3.1/coverweb/ty/ff.html (last visited Jan.

20, 2008).
123. 321 Studios, 307 F.Supp.2dat 1101.
124. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 n.4 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984)).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Corley, 273 F.3d at 458).
127. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (2004); United States v. Elcom, Ltd.,
203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
128. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 (followed by 321 Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d at 1101).
129. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
130. Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d at 1131.
131. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
132. Id.
133. See generally 321 Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085; Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d 1111; Corley,
273 F.3d 429.
134. Elcom,203F.Supp.2dat 1131.
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intellectual property has reached epidemic proportions."'' 35 Along with
Congress, the judiciary is willing to prioritize the protection of copyright
over its limitations, even if it means extending that protection to the
technology of private parties.
IV. Digital Paradigms Can Develop Successfully Under The
DMCA's Privatization
Though accurate conclusions are ultimately reached, the courts' fair
use analysis does not do justice to an important hole in the DMCA's
theoretical preservation of fair use.' 3 6 The DMCA's anti-circumvention
measures allow a user to circumvent a "technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner" (such as DRM) for the
purposes of the fair use of that work. 13 7 Yet, the so-called "antitrafficking" provision makes it illegal for anyone to "traffic in any
technology" made primarily to allow circumvention. 138 The question is
whether these potentially conflicting doctrines can be reconciled in a
manner that preserves their respective purposes.
To illustrate, consider a Ph.D. candidate writing a dissertation who
wishes to make a fair use of a quote from a book protected by a private
party's (the publisher) technological measure. 139 Unless she happens to be
an expert in reverse-engineering DRM technology, she would need an
expert to create the software for her. 140 But when that expert develops or
distributes the software in the United States, he commits a crime under
section 1201(b)(1).141
Proposed DMCA reform legislation, the "Freedom And Innovation
Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act [FAIR USE Act]," contains
provisions that seek to better effectuate fair use. 142 For example, the
provisions include exemptions that allow users to make "a compilation of
audiovisual works" for classroom use, and "access works in the public
domain."' 143 The critical missing link, however, is that the exemptions
135. Id. at 1132.
136. H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 (1998) ("The Committee on Commerce devoted substantial time
and resources to analyzing the implications of this broad prohibition [anti-circumvention] on the
traditional pnnciple of 'fair use."').
137. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(b)(1)(A), 1201(c) (2001).
138. Id.
139. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 673, 727 (Jan. 2000).
140. Id.
141. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
142. Tim Lee, FAIR USE Act Analysis: DMCA Reform Left on the Cutting Room Floor, Ars
Technica, Feb. 28, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070228-8942.html.
143. Id.
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would not apply to "trafficking" in the software necessary for fair users to
gain access in the first place.144 Thus, the Ph.D. candidate will not likely be
able to exercise her fair use right because trafficking in the software will
remain a crime.
Nevertheless, as substantiated by Congress and the courts, the
DMCA's privatization of copyright does not reach too far. 45 The Ph.D.
student example is merely an outlier among an immense sea of online
piracy. Remember that since Napster launched in 1999, music shipments
dropped a painful 33%. 146 Once digital media became free, copyright
owners needed a radical solution. Since federal copyright protection
became virtually unenforceable, the DMCA's anti-circumvention measures
allowed digital content owners to wrap media in their own private digital
chains. 147 When critics cry out about outliers like the Ph.D. student, they
unfairly portray the DMCA as a removal of rights by the government. This
completely obfuscates the DMCA. Billions of rights were being infringed
online, and the DMCA laid a framework for much needed effective
protection of those rights.
Critics cite current piracy statistics as proof that the DMCA has failed.
True, estimates for the number of illegally traded music tracks exceed 1
billion per month. 148 Steve Jobs, however, is quick to point out that the
vast majority of music stolen online got there in the first place via an
unprotected CD file. 149 CDs are the old world, digital files are the new. As
the media world progresses further in the shift from physical to digital, a
legal framework for success is already laid out by the DMCA. To harness
the DMCA's power, copyright owners must release works that are
ubiquitouslyprotectedfrom the time of release. This is a tough proposition
for the music industry at the moment because the bulk of its revenue still
comes from physical sales. But the declining physical sales and the
explosion of the digital music industry are a clear signal. The world is
going digital, and the fight against online piracy is far from conceded. 50
144.

Id.

145. See generally 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (2004); United States
v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (2002); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001); Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
146. RIAA 2006 Year End Shipment Statistics, available at http://www.riaa.com/
keystatistics.php (follow "2006 U.S. Manufacturers' Unit Shipments and Value Chart" hyperlink)
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
147. Olive, supra note 46.
148. P2P File Sharing Is Here to Stay, P2Pnet.net, http://p2pnet.net/story/11257 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2008).
149. Jobs, supra note 35.
150. 10,037 P2P lawsuits were filed by the RIAA between 2003 and 2005. Thomas
Mennecke, RIAA's Grand Total: 10,037 - What are Your Odds?, May 2, 2005,
http://www.slyck.com/news.php?story=769.
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The DMCA is set up to allow new online rights to be fully protected. If the
industry successfully shifts to a fully digital paradigm, the DMCA will
support the secure distribution of content. Only at that point should
Congress step in to carve out ad hoc exceptions for fair use circumvention
software (the issue raised in the Ph.D. example). For now, threats to the
content industry are too great, and progress is best encouraged through the
DMCA's constitutionally sound privatization of copyright.
V. Conclusion
More than twenty years ago, the landmark decision in Sony v.
Universal opened the door to home video tape recorders, a new technology
that presented a significant threat to copyright holders. 15 ' Although the
machines could record and make copies of copyrighted works, the Supreme
Court held they were capable of substantial noninfringing uses, and were
therefore legal under the doctrine of fair use. 152 The analysis in Section III
reveals how different today's legal climate is from the time of Sony. Elcom
and Corley are much less willing to make concessions to statutory or
constitutional limitations of copyright. The industry is experiencing a
drastic paradigm shift, while courts remain scrupulously in line with
Congress's DMCA. The DMCA sanctions anti-circumvention, which in
turn allows private copyright owners to use protective technology like
DRM. This level of protection grants a privatized self-help where previous
copyright law proved patently insufficient. Such protection is
constitutional, and should be encouraged to the utmost until piracy is under
control and the industry has fully instituted its new digital countenance.

151.
152.

Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 456.
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